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1. Introduction  
Economic, institutional, government, and individual characteristics are usually perceived 
as relevant determinants of capital markets developments, notably regarding sovereign ratings. 
Indeed, governments are responsible for the implementation of economic policy, especially at 
the macro and fiscal level, and therefore the behaviour of governments also plays a role as a 
potential determinant of financial and capital markets outcomes.  
For instance, Ministers of Finance are major key players in implementing fiscal and 
macroeconomic policies and in shaping expectations about their future behavior, since they 
have the resources notably to produce economic and fiscal forecasts (von Hagen, 2010). Since 
capital markets and rating agencies take into account fiscal policy developments in an 
expectational view when setting both long-term yields and sovereign ratings, the personal 
characteristics of those policy makers are quite relevant, namely in terms academic and 
professional background, for purposes related to credibility. 
There are broadly two approaches concerning fiscal governance via the Ministry of 
Finance: delegation and contracts. In the first one the Finance Minister is responsible for the 
overall budget. In addition, under the contracts approach, Finance Ministers are in charge of 
managing the budget process.  
Moreover, finance Ministers play an important role in determining public deficits 
(Jochimsen and Thomasius, 2014) and influencing public debt dynamics (Moessinger, 2014). 
Ganapolsky & Schmukler (1998) show that after a period of high volatility and political turmoil, 
a change of the Finance Minister reduces the variance of both stock and bond market returns. 
Hence, possible (positive) spillovers can also occur for sovereign ratings. 
On the other hand, several authors addressed the issue of the determinants of sovereign 
ratings, notably Cantor and Packer (1996), who identified per capita income, GDP growth, 
inflation, external debt, level of economic development and default history as important 
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determinants for Moody’s and S&P. Afonso (2003), who also included a logistic and an 
exponential transformation of the ratings, in addition to the linear transformation already used 
in the literature. Mulder and Monfort (2000) generalized the OLS approach to panel data, using 
a linear transformation of the ratings. 
In this context, and to overcome the limitation of OLS regressions with a linear 
transformation of the ratings, Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005) used an ordered probit model for 
a period of five years and 95 countries.1 Moreover, Afonso et al. (2008) analysed the 
determinants of sovereign ratings from the three main agencies by using a linear regression 
framework (random effects estimation, pooled OLS estimation and fixed effects estimation) 
versus an ordered probit response framework.2  
Nevertheless, Afonso et al. (2011) confirm that logistic and exponential transformations 
to ratings provide little improvement over the linear transformation, not finding evidence of the 
so-called “cliff effects” (when investors adjust their portfolio composition to select only 
investment grade securities). They also highlight the difference between short- and long-term 
determinants, concluding that GDP per capita, GDP growth, government debt and budget 
balance have a short-term impact, whereas government effectiveness, external debt, foreign 
reserves and default history influence ratings in the long-run. 
Finally, Amstad and Packer (2015) used several explanatory variables as proxies for fiscal, 
economic and institutional strength, monetary regime, external position and default history and 
concludes that a small set of factors can largely explain the rating scale.  
In this paper, we contribute to literature by assessing to what extent the characteristics of a 
major policy maker, the Minister of Finance, play a role in the setting by the rating agencies of 
                                                          
1 An OLS regression with a linear transformation of the ratings assumes a constant distance between adjacent 
rating notches. However, ratings represent a qualitative ordinal assessment of a sovereign credit risk, thus the 
distance between two adjacent ratings may not be the same 
2 Instead of assuming a rigid shape of the ratings scale, this model estimates the threshold values between rating 
notches, defining the shape of the ratings curve. 
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the long-term sovereign rating notations. Our main results point to the fact that the existence of 
more focused delegation oriented fiscal framework, the Minister of Finance being a woman, 
and the Minister of Finance having a degree in the areas of finance or “hard sciences”,  seems 
to contribute to a better sovereign rating notation, and the opposite in the case of a Law 
background.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology 
and the data set. Section 3 reports and discusses the empirical results. Section 4  concludes. 
 
2. Methodology and Data 
To estimate the impact on credit ratings, ,, of our set of finance ministers´ characteristics, 
we run the following reduced-form regression: 
 , =  +  + 	
, + ,
 + , (1) 
where  are country-fixed effects capturing unobserved heterogeneity across countries, and 
time-unvarying factors;  are time effects to control for global shocks; 
, are the time-
varying set of finance ministers´ characteristics (see below for details);  is a vector of 
macroeconomic variables, lagged to reduce reverse causality.3 Following the literature (Cantor 
and Packer´s (1996) seminal paper and Monfort and Mulder (2000) and Bissoondoyal-Bheenick 
(2005)), this vector includes the following key determinants of sovereign credit ratings 
(expected sign in parenthesis): real GDP per capita (+), real GDP growth (+), inflation rate (+/-), 
debt-to-GDP ratio (-), foreign reserves (+), terms-of-trade (+/-), unemployment rate (-). 
In addition to using each rating agency´s assessment separately as dependent variables we 
also take two aggregate measures: the first, results from taking the simple average across the 
                                                          
3 Similar results obtained using contemporaneous regressors (not shown). 
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three agencies (Ratings_Avg); the second uses a Principal Component Analysis to extract the 
common factor (Ratings_PCA).4 
There are two econometric approaches typically employed in the literature looking at credit 
ratings determinants. One uses linear regression methods to a linear numerical representation 
of the ratings (e.g. Cantor and Packer, 1996; Afonso, 2003) since the OLS application is simple 
and allows for simple generalizations to panel data settings (Mora, 2006). The second uses 
ordered response models given the fact that ratings are a qualitative ordinal measure and 
traditional linear estimation techniques are not adequate (for instance, they are biased even in 
large samples – see Hu et al., 2002; Depken et al., 2007). 
Therefore, in the context of an ordered response model, an unobserved latent variable *
itR  
has a linear form and depends on the same variables as before: 
*
itR =  +  + 	
, + ,−1
′ + ,
   (2) 
with several cut-off points to draw up the boundaries of each rating category, and the final rating 










 ( )                          
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AAA Aaa if R c
AA Aa if c R c
R AA Aa if c R c










The difference between the cut off points determines a non-linearity is the effect of variables 
(i.e. it might be easier to move from AA to AA+, then the subsequent move to AAA. 
For our empirical analysis, we rely on two main estimators: OLS with robust standard errors 
clustered at the country level and for robustness purposes two ordered models (probit and logit) 
                                                          
4 A likelihood ratio test was used to examine the “sphericity” case. This test comfortably rejects sphericity at the 
1 percent level.  
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estimated using maximum likelihood using a robust variance-covariance matrix to account for 
serial correlation (see Afonso et al., 2011 for details).  
Regarding the dataset of the charecteristics of Ministers of Finance, we draw on Afonso 
and Guedes (2014). Some stylised facts of the Ministers’s of Finance academic background, in 
terms of share in the overall data sample, are: Economics (39.8 percent); Law (21.3 percent); 
Management (7.0 percent ); Finance/Accounting (10.4 percent ); other Social Sciences (7.9 
percent ); “Hard Sciences” (4.6 percent) no formal education (8.9 percent ). The average age of 
Finance Ministers was around 51 years old, the average tenure was about 2 years, and 4 percent 
of Finance Ministers were women. For the purpose of the empirical analysis, we code the 
academic background characteristics as follows: Economics, degree1; Law, degree2; 
Management, degree3; Finance/Accounting, degree4; Other social sciences, degree5; “Hard 
sciences”, degree6.  
Our sample consists of a total of 26 advanced countries between 1980-2012. Data on our 
dependent variable, ,, includes data from the three main rating agencies, S&P, Moody´s and 
Fitch Ratings attributed at 31st December. Similarly to Afonso et al. (2011), we group the 
qualitative sovereign rating notations in 21 categories by putting together the few observations 
below C, which are given the value one, while AAA observations receive the value 21 (see 
Table A1 in the appendix).  
All macroeconomic and fiscal variables are retrieved from the IMF´s World Economic 
Outlook Database.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
Table 1 reports the baseline results for the estimation of specification (1), using the average 
ratings form the three main rating agencies. The core determinants turn out to have the expected 
effect as identified in previous literature, notably increases in per capita GDP and in the foreign 
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reserves, as well as improvements in the terms of trade contribute to the increase in the 
sovereign rating. On the other hand, higher debt-to-GDP ratio, inflation rate and unemployment 
imply a worsening of the credit ratings. 
[Table 1] 
Regarding the specific characteristics of the Ministries of Finance, we find that when they 
are women there is a positive effect towards sovereign credit ratings, and the same is true for 
tenure of the Ministries. In addition, the academic background of the Ministry of Finance in the 
area of Finance (taking into account country fixed effects in the estimation procedure), seems 
to contribute to attain higher rating levels. Moreover, delegation in the budget procedure also 
increases the rating notations. 
 In Table 2, we report the results from the analysis using as dependent variable the 
separate rating notations from each of the three rating agencies, their simple average value and 
also the (first) common factor from the Principal Component Analysis. In addtion, we also 
assess the probability of rating changes via an ordered Probit and Logit analysis. 
[Table 2] 
 Results from the individual estimation per rating agency confirm the baseline findings 
in terms of the core determinants of the ratings, already mentione above (columns 1, 2, and 3 
in Table 2). However, in terms of the characteristics of the Ministers, a degree in Law seems to 
lower rating notation in the case of Standard & Poor’s. 
Turning to the estimation results from ordered models, we do not find any statistical 
significance vis-à-vis sovereign ratings regarding the academic characteristics of Ministers. 
When we peform an additional sensitivity analysis (see the Appendix), adding finance 
ministers´ characteristics one at a time, we find similar outcomes, notably regarding the 





Finance Ministers play an important role in determining public deficits and influencing 
public debt dynamics. As a result, they shape investors´ expectations regarding the pricing of 
risk over bond issuance as their credibility and policies may affect yields. In this paper, we 
empirically evaluated to what extent the characteristics of a major policy maker, the Minister 
of Finance, are relevant in the setting by the rating agencies of the long-term sovereign rating 
notations.  
Looking at a sample of 26 EU countries over more than 30 years, we uncover that the 
existence of a more focused delegation oriented fiscal framework, the Minister of Finance being 
a woman, and the Minister of Finance having a degree in the areas of finance or “hard sciences”,  
seems to improve the sovereign rating notation, while the opposite takes place if the Minister 
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Table 1 – Baseline Regressions 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Regressors          
          
Real GDP per capita (t-1) -0.459 -0.065 -0.037 1.705 1.756** 2.005*** 4.152 4.395*** 4.652*** 
 (0.493) (0.160) (0.150) (1.618) (0.738) (0.694) (3.148) (1.348) (1.330) 
Real GDP growth (t-1) 0.051 0.073 0.098 0.118** 0.119*** 0.102*** 0.249** 0.249*** 0.234*** 
 (0.068) (0.061) (0.064) (0.052) (0.036) (0.035) (0.096) (0.065) (0.067) 
Inflation rate (t-1) -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Terms-of-trade (t-1) 0.056 0.094*** 0.092*** 0.068*** 0.073*** 0.080*** 0.043* 0.045** 0.051*** 
 (0.079) (0.032) (0.035) (0.024) (0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.017) (0.018) 
Debt-to-GDP ratio (t-1) -0.008 -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.042** -0.042*** -0.043*** 
 (0.017) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) 
Foreign reserves (t-1) 1.076*** 0.665*** 0.568*** 0.224 0.224* 0.204 0.217 0.214* 0.211 
 (0.291) (0.167) (0.175) (0.174) (0.128) (0.133) (0.161) (0.132) (0.136) 
Unemployment rate (t-1) -0.356*** -0.318*** -0.287*** -0.069 -0.069* -0.075* -0.026 -0.024 -0.029 
 (0.121) (0.045) (0.044) (0.067) (0.039) (0.039) (0.074) (0.039) (0.039) 
female_it  1.509*** 1.453***  0.467** 0.601***  0.565*** 0.685*** 
  (0.447) (0.382)  (0.188) (0.215)  (0.218) (0.248) 
age  0.008 0.007  -0.013 -0.019**  -0.006 -0.011 
  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.009) (0.010)  (0.009) (0.010) 
tenure  0.191*** 0.199***  0.001 -0.000  -0.014 -0.016 
  (0.055) (0.054)  (0.026) (0.027)  (0.024) (0.025) 
delegation  2.029*** 1.777***  6.996*** 7.401***  8.047*** 8.338*** 
  (0.361) (0.376)  (0.523) (0.579)  (0.576) (0.620) 
degree1   -1.759***   0.274   0.158 
   (0.482)   (0.205)   (0.187) 
degree2   -0.640   -0.237   -0.266 
   (0.439)   (0.193)   (0.212) 
degree3   -1.319*   -0.147   0.110 
   (0.738)   (0.339)   (0.378) 
degree4   -2.768***   0.853**   0.325 
   (0.813)   (0.335)   (0.380) 
degree5   -0.136   -0.187   -0.110 
   (0.532)   (0.267)   (0.299) 
degree6   -0.791   0.744**   0.597 
   (0.672)   (0.366)   (0.384) 
Country Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 
R-squared 0.322 0.388 0.437 0.881 0.882 0.888 0.901 0.902 0.905 
 
Notes: Estimation by OLS. Economics, degree1; Law, degree2; Management, degree3; Finance/Accounting, 
degree4; Other social sciences, degree5; “Hard sciences”, degree6. Constant term as well as country and time 
effects (where applicable) omitted for reasons of parsimony. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** 














Table 2 – Robustness Regressions 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS Ordered Probit Ordered Logit 
Dependent variable S&P Moodys Fitch Ratings_PCA Ratings_Avg Ratings_Avg 
Regressors       
       
Real GDP per capita (t-1) 5.377*** 4.023*** 3.020** 0.929*** 4.468*** 10.071*** 
 (1.061) (1.515) (1.181) (0.266) (1.424) (3.372) 
Real GDP growth (t-1) 0.176*** 0.258*** 0.227*** 0.047*** 0.112*** 0.211* 
 (0.050) (0.072) (0.061) (0.013) (0.044) (0.111) 
Inflation rate (t-1) -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001* 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Terms-of-trade (t-1) 0.045*** 0.043** 0.046** 0.010*** 0.032* 0.053* 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.018) (0.004) (0.018) (0.033) 
Debt-to-GDP ratio (t-1) -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.009*** -0.050*** -0.097*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.010) (0.025) 
Foreign reserves (t-1) 0.158 0.344** 0.212* 0.042 0.117 0.063 
 (0.132) (0.155) (0.130) (0.027) (0.105) (0.251) 
Unemployment rate (t-1) -0.015 -0.037 -0.040 -0.006 -0.077** -0.061 
 (0.037) (0.043) (0.035) (0.008) (0.034) (0.073) 
female_it 0.761*** 0.703*** 0.464* 0.137*** 0.138 -0.047 
 (0.229) (0.262) (0.260) (0.050) (0.276) (0.536) 
age -0.007 -0.017 -0.006 -0.002 -0.011 -0.004 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.002) (0.012) (0.027) 
tenure -0.042** -0.012 0.015 -0.003 0.075* 0.084 
 (0.021) (0.029) (0.027) (0.005) (0.039) (0.086) 
delegation 8.906*** 7.738*** 8.029*** 1.671*** 15.333*** 35.096*** 
 (0.529) (0.691) (0.529) (0.124) (1.185) (2.806) 
degree1 0.061 0.075 0.157 0.032 -0.079 0.090 
 (0.183) (0.239) (0.205) (0.037) (0.303) (0.614) 
degree2 -0.464** -0.230 -0.266 -0.054 -0.454 -0.367 
 (0.208) (0.254) (0.215) (0.042) (0.338) (0.707) 
degree3 0.141 -0.156 0.358 0.023 0.149 0.004 
 (0.352) (0.419) (0.340) (0.076) (0.522) (1.016) 
degree4 0.383 0.237 0.608 0.066 0.394 0.880 
 (0.350) (0.448) (0.405) (0.076) (0.467) (1.011) 
degree5 -0.135 -0.367 -0.091 -0.022 -0.214 -0.009 
 (0.282) (0.362) (0.285) (0.060) (0.545) (1.224) 
degree6 0.357 0.521 0.495 0.119 0.439 0.929 
 (0.347) (0.362) (0.414) (0.077) (0.593) (1.249) 
Constant -7.718** -4.072 -0.249 -3.959***   
 (3.682) (5.323) (3.939) (0.918)   
Country effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 390 380 362 352 352 352 
R-squared 0.909 0.874 0.906 0.906   
Notes: Alternative estimators and dependent variables identified in rows 2 and 3, respectively. Economics, 
degree1; Law, degree2; Management, degree3; Finance/Accounting, degree4; Other social sciences, degree5; 
“Hard sciences”, degree6. Constant term as well as country and time effects (where applicable) omitted for reasons 
of parsimony. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 















List of countries 
 
United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Cyprus, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia, Poland. 
 
 
Table A1 – Quantitavive ordinal credit rating transformation 
  
Ordinal scale S&P Moody’s Fitch 
Highest quality 21 AAA Aaa AAA 
High quality 20 AA+ Aa1 AA+ 
19 AA Aa2 AA 
18 AA- Aa3 AA- 
Strong payment 
capacity 
17 A+ A1 A+ 
16 A A2 A 
15 A- A3 A- 
Adequate payment 
capacity 
14 BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 
13 BBB Baa2 BBB 
12 BBB- Baa3 BBB- 
Likely to fulfil 
obligations, ongoing 
uncertainty 
11 BB+ Ba1 BB+ 
10 BB Ba2 BB 
9 BB- Ba3 BB- 
High credit risk 
8 B+ B1 B+ 
7 B B2 B 
6 B- B3 B- 
Very high credit risk 
5 CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 
4 CCC Caa2 CCC 
3 CCC- Caa4 CCC- 
Near default with 
possibility of recovery 
2 CC Ca CC 
1 C C C 











Table A2 – Sensitivity Analysis: adding finance ministers´ characteristics one at a time 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Regressors            
Real GDP per capita (t-1) 4.323*** 4.211*** 4.165*** 4.152*** 4.053*** 4.120*** 4.181*** 4.153*** 4.145*** 4.355*** 
 (1.364) (1.337) (1.363) (1.356) (1.376) (1.347) (1.361) (1.359) (1.348) (1.338) 
Real GDP growth (t-1) 0.250*** 0.248*** 0.251*** 0.249*** 0.248*** 0.245*** 0.253*** 0.244*** 0.249*** 0.247*** 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.061) (0.064) (0.068) (0.064) (0.064) 
Inflation rate (t-1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Terms-of-trade (t-1) 0.043** 0.045** 0.043** 0.043** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.041** 0.042** 0.043** 0.043** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Debt-to-GDP ratio (t-1) -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.043*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Foreign reserves (t-1) 0.215* 0.218* 0.216* 0.217* 0.228* 0.220* 0.221* 0.202 0.218* 0.220* 
 (0.130) (0.130) (0.131) (0.130) (0.132) (0.128) (0.130) (0.136) (0.129) (0.129) 
Unemployment rate (t-1) -0.022 -0.027 -0.026 -0.026 -0.030 -0.026 -0.026 -0.027 -0.029 -0.024 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
female_it 0.565***          
 (0.217)          
age  -0.006         
  (0.009)         
tenure   -0.020        
   (0.023)        
delegation    7.918***       
    (0.567)       
degree1     0.161      
     (0.161)      
degree2      -0.316*     
      (0.184)     
degree3       0.186    
       (0.295)    
degree4        0.244   
        (0.378)   
degree5         -0.229  
         (0.243)  
degree6          0.442 
          (0.355) 
Country effects 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 
Time effects 0.902 0.901 0.901 0.901 0.901 0.902 0.901 0.901 0.901 0.902 
Observations 352 352 352 352 380 380 380 380 380 380 
R-squared 0.902 0.901 0.901 0.901 0.869 0.869 0.869 0.869 0.870 0.870 
 
Notes: Economics, degree1; Law, degree2; Management, degree3; Finance/Accounting, degree4; Other social 
sciences, degree5; “Hard sciences”, degree6. Constant term as well as country and time effects (where applicable) 
omitted for reasons of parsimony. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
